INTRODUCTION:

As internal ethnic conflicts continue to rage in developing parts of the globe the international community is faced with the question of what can be done to quell such battles. Often times, states are left to confront their own problems despite a lack of resources or know-how. It seems that they would be better off with the assistance of more knowledgeable and experienced nations. While there are some who feel that foreign powers have no right to intervene in domestic issues on the basis of sovereignty, there are others who believe they do have the right to step in on behalf of humanitarianism. Once the right to intervene has been established there is still the issue of how to become involved. There are some methods of intervention that might seem more appropriate for specific situations than others, and there are some methods which could prove to be more damaging than helpful. In the case of the Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Biafran Independence Movement, a persecuted minority saw secession as the only means in their power to end ethnic cleansing of their people in the northern region of Nigeria. Though initially reluctant, external powers ended up participating in the movement, on one side or the other, and their external support ended up having significant effects on the outcome of the war. The outcome, a failure for Biafra, leaves much to be examined, including the effectiveness of using the right to secede as a way to end ethnic conflict. Looking at the significant effect that Europe had on the war, we can also examine how the European colonial legacy has impacted relations in African states. In the end we should use what we know to form an opinion on the wisdom of using secession as a means to end conflict, and the kind of impact colonialism continues to have on African nations.

PART 1: SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA AND THE O.A.U.

The notion of having a "right to secede" is a fairly new one, emerging with the end of the Cold War and rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. The right was to be held by ethnic groups and was taken from the principle of self-determination of nations, which formed an integral part of Woodrow Wilson’s plans for post-World War I Europe. It was yet unclear if that notion was applicable for ethnic minorities. The Wilsonian policy did not go as far as to grant national or ethnic groups their own states, and by the time of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 self-determination was to be limited to "peoples living under foreign domination." An exception was made in the case of Yugoslavia which was declared a federation in the process of dissolution, which entitled its constituent republics to secede intact. The right to secede was justified in several ways, one being that on the basis of self-determination people have the rights to choose their own political regime, and to be free of authoritarian oppression. Another justification stemmed from the individual right to political self-expression, which also applies to groups. In the group application this right both means self-government, and implies territorial control. A final validation for secession is that it was seen by many as a last resort to fight against political oppression.

Secession seemed like it would be an appealing option for both sides involved, but it faced great opposition in the international community. For the seceding minority it was an opportunity to escape oppression, and the dominating majority would be able to rid themselves of a troubling and unwanted minority population. There were, however, certain assumptions that accompanied the belief that an ethnic group could successfully secede to resolve conflicts. If those assumptions proved to be more fiction than fact, opposition to secession appeared. One assumption is related to the ethnic make-up of both nations post-secession. It was thought that through secession ethnic conflict would reduce because more homogenous populations would be created. This theory could prove false in two ways. First, the population that seceded would most likely simply become the majority and create new minority groups in their newly independent region. Second, the ethnic balance of the remaining region would be upset, possibly creating greater opportunity for oppression and discrimination of minorities, and undermining attempts to achieve interethnic accommodation within states. Another assumption is that the seceding region would be economically viable. The last thing the world needs is yet another country unable to support and develop itself, creating more suffering. Taking these assumptions into consideration secession should be attempted only when absolutely necessary and totally justified.

Let us now look to the African example. Africa is a continent where even many families are split along ethnic lines. It is a continent that has a strong colonial history which has created a strong sense of nationalism among its native people. The nationalistic tendencies initially took root in independence movements aimed at removing European power structures from Africa. The lasting effect of European colonizers is still present in Africa, evident in the arbitrary borders and fabricated nations which comprise the continent, and in the continuous internal struggles that rage across the land. Considering the unique African experience, secessionist movements should have been given special consideration, while still handled with caution because of the already fragile state of the continent. On one hand, by stretching the Wilsonian concept we conclude "every nationality that demands statehood and is able to discharge its responsibilities is entitled to it." On the other hand, secession from independent states was never widely accepted as it would be "a dangerous precedent that would undermine the legitimacy of multi-national states. Territorial integrity is in effect elevated to an absolute principle," (Kamanu, 360). A middle ground was the most appropriate. Secession could not be justified solely on the existence of ethnic or cultural differences among a population, there must be evidence that members of the seceding group could no longer live in peace and security or fulfill their legitimate individual aspirations within the larger political community. In effect, they would have to prove that the arbitrary territorial boundaries created by their former colonizers were, in some way, hazardous. Even in that case, there are still some theorists who believe that the seceding group must also have exhausted all other possible solutions to end grievances.

Is it realistic to expect a group that is being discriminated against to wait until all other solutions have been attempted before taking action that could put an immediate end to their problem? There are some who look to the overall good of Africa as trumping the individual rights of ethnic groups. For that reason we must look at the effect that secession has on Africa as a continent. Those opposed to secession argue that states that secede are inherently incompatible with the goal of African unity, and this conventional wisdom is widely accepted. The other side saw that secessions may, in one respect, facilitate the process of pan-African political unification by lessening the fear of domination entertained by the smaller states. Also, the breakup of African giants would make the leaders less confident in their ability to "go it alone." A danger that secession could have had for Africa is the domino "theory" of secessions. It claims that "a successful secession anywhere in African would create a demonstration effect that would bring with it the disintegration of existing states and the complete balkanization of the continent." The upshot of this theory is that a failed secession attempt would have a deterrent effect on potential secessionist movements elsewhere. The problem with this theory is that because there have been no successful secessionist movements in Africa there is no empirical evidence on which to base the domino "theory." So, in actuality the threat that secession had to the unity of the African continent was as assumed as the benefits that secession could have had for ethnic minorities.

The Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) was founded on May 25, 1963 with the purpose of promoting unity and solidarity of the African states and to act as a collective voice for the continent. It was also committed to the decolonization of Africa and established a special committee to aid independence movements. Yet in 1964 they made it clear that secessionist threats to the territorial integrity of states would not be regarded as further exercises of self-determination. Though the O.A.U. was created to be a resource and benefit to African nations, the contradictory policies and crippling stipulations made it a burden more than anything else, as it was incapable of dealing realistically with secessionist conflicts. For example, in the same charter in which it passed resolutions condemning secession and promised to work to maintain territorial integrity, the O.A.U. also declared that secession is a matter within a member’s domestic jurisdiction, which precludes external interference. In its charter it was prevented from dealing with issues that fall within the domestic domain of its members and according to the O.A.U. itself, secession is within the domestic domain. The O.A.U. charter made it very difficult for it to justify any position it took in secessionist movements. At the same time, it disallowed it from settling conflicts whose terms might favor secession because it had an obligation to defend the territorial integrity of its members even against threats of a purely internal origin. Basically, the O.A.U. was useless in solving separationist conflicts because it was unable to come to terms with the problems that bred secessionist desires. Also, it needed some capacity to mediate in internal conflicts. It never did develop into a cell capable of protecting the African people from their leaders or uniting the continent, and after 39 years was disbanded in July of 2002.

PART II: THE SETTING FOR SECESSION

Nigeria was granted independence from Britain on October 1, 1960. With that independence very little changed in Nigeria and the post-colonial system was no different from the colonial system. Nigerian maintained all the principal attributes of a colony, the only real change being that a good number of European colonial officials left the country. In fact, classical aspects and methods of colonialism were systematically adopted by the Nigerian ruling elite such as exploitation of traditional rivalries and conflicts for political purposes, extortion, etc., in effect simply shifting the dominance from one group to another. The problem here was that the majority of the nationalist sentiment came from the Western-educated, English speaking minority. The same sector that pushed so hard and most desired independence would find themselves once again dominated. This situation was bound to lead to yet another call for freedom.

The Biafrans seeking secession from Nigeria mostly consisted of Ibos from the eastern region of Nigeria. They were the majority in that area but were an overall minority in Nigeria, especially in the northern region. It was the treatment of Ibos in the northern regions which most influenced their decision to break away from the central government. Native Ibos were for the most part relegated to the southern and eastern regions of Nigeria but through migration started to form a significant minority population in the North. The problem was not just the size of the Nigerian population, but also the make-up. There are various theories for why there was so much resentment of Ibos in the North and the number of them moving north is the least influential.

Missionary activities had great effects on Ibo people and while it was constructive for them culturally, it created resentment from other ethnic groups who then began to feel inferior. European missionary activities introduced reading, writing, and anew standard of hygiene. Also, lessons in morality curbed the infanticide of twins and female circumcision which led to an increased population and the need for migration from the densely populated Ibo region. Normally, the Ibo in the North would have been forced to accept the Hausa-Fulani culture, but thanks to British colonial law they were granted legal protection in their segregated ghettos. Also, the Ibo, being more educated, tended to have an advantage over the Hausa-Fulani group in the competition for employment and this created more resentment against Ibos and other southern Nigerians by Northerners. While Christian missionaries had a strong presence in the southern regions of Nigeria, they were scarce in the North and so for the most part northerners were Muslim. This created religious tension when Christian southerners moved into the predominantly Muslim northern regions. A final cause of resentment towards Ibos in the North was misdirected frustration from the Hausa commoners who were angry at a corrupt administration but unable to get rid of the ruling class while easily able to identify and strike out against the Ibo minority. At the same time, Ibos would also ally with radical Hausa commoners against the ruling aristocracy and so would also be victimized by the Fulani rulers.

In addition to ethnic conflict, there were also intense inter-regional conflicts and rivalries. The northern regions had over 50% of Nigeria’s population which created an inbuilt political imbalance. With the power to elect half of the members of Nigeria’s parliament, the northern region was as politically important as the other three regions combined. This caused resentment from other regions who did not like being dominated by a region which was economically, socially, and educationally more backward than any other. We see the impact of the colonial legacy here because this power was leftover from when the British colonial administration had given all their support to the rulers of the northern region. In fact, before the arrival of British colonialism in Nigeria, the various tribes and ethnic groups were barely even aware of the existence of the others. The realization that they belonged to common cultures was realized when they were united through colonization. To a certain extent the European presence stifled any violent expression of tribal hostility, but it still made use of tribal rivalries for their own commercial and political ends. Even after the removal of the colonial presence, the use of tribal antagonisms continued with the native leaders put into place by the Europeans.

Though the resentment faced by Ibos in the North made life more difficult, it did not push them towards secession. It was not until the resentment against them turned violent that Ibos sought out a nation of their own. The escalation to violence was quick. In January of 1966 there was a military coup that left General Aguiyi Ironsi, an Ibo born and raised in the northern region, in charge of the country. He was directed to unify the country as soon as possible. His attempt to do so was broadcast on May 24, 1966: Decree Number 34 which would abolish former regions and divide Nigeria into provinces, making it the Republic of Nigeria rather than a federation. This frightened the Northerners who correctly thought that if jobs were offered on merit then they would not be able to compete with the comparatively better educated southerners. Out of fear of southern, particularly Ibo, domination northerners staged a coup against Ironsi’s military regime, killing nearly all men of eastern Nigerian origin, many of western and Midwestern origin, and civilians of southern origin as well. Before long Ibos were being filtered out and slaughtered. General Ironsi, at this point, did not take action but instead tried to explain his Unitarianism in military terms, and when that failed tried to blame the British. He was unable to resolve the situation and ended up fleeing Lagos, never to return.

In July another coup took place, this time engineered by northerners in an attempt to avenge the death of northern senior army officers, to take over power at the center and, some believe, to secede from the Republic of Nigeria. Yet again Ibos, this time officers and soldiers, were singled out and shot to death. Once the Ibos in the West and Lagos, as well as General Ironsi, were taken care of, the rebellion spread to other regions throughout Nigeria. In the weeks following the coup there were indiscriminate massacres of Ibos in the North. Efforts were made to find the most suitable political arrangement by creating an Ad Hoc Constitutional Review Conference in Lagos on September 12, 1966. However, the conference was interrupted by the outbreak of a second and even more devastating massacre of the Ibos in the North. The situation was out of control, there was no way to assure there would be no more killings of Ibos, and so the only thing left to do was leave. Even as Easterners struggled to move east they were shot, beaten down, clubbed, even decapitated alive. The massacres led to a great migration of Easterners back to the East, all convinced that the Nigerian government would not, and could not, offer them the simple guarantees of security of life and property. At this point the crisis was at its peak and the possibility of a complete breakup of the federation was a definite possibility.

PART III: AN INDEPENDENT BIAFRA

In response to the growing crisis in Nigeria a tribunal was established in December 1966 to look into the horrors committed against eastern natives living in the northern region and other parts of the Nigerian federation. Throughout Nigeria popular demand was for a meeting of military leaders to, at the very least, get back on speaking terms. It was arranged for a meeting of the Supreme Council in Ghana to take place the 4^th and 5^th of January. The Ibo leader, Colonel Ojukwu, submitted the following resolution:

We, members of the supreme Military Council of Nigeria, meeting at Accra on the 4^th of January, 1967, hereby solemnly and unequivocally:

Declare that we renounce the use of force as a means of settling the present crisis in Nigeria and hold ourselves in honor bound by this declaration.

Reaffirm our faith in discussions and negotiations as the only peaceful way of resolving the Nigerian crisis.

Direct that a copy of this declaration be deposited with the Secretariat of the Organization of African Unity.

After the third clause was deleted since the Nigerian crisis was an internal affair, the resolution was adopted. The delegates proceeded to resolve the problems with the central government and reached agreements which would afford Easterners the minimum essential guarantees for their own security. However, the Aburi agreement was never implemented and on May 30, 1967 Colonel Ojukwu read the following Declaration of Independence:

Fellow countrymen and women, you, the people of Eastern Nigeria:

Conscious of the supreme authority of Almighty God over all mankind; of your duty to yourselves and posterity; aware that you can no longer be protected in your lived and in your property by any government based outside Eastern Nigeria… unwilling to be unfree partners in any association of a political or economic nature;… now, therefore, I, Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumewu Ojukwu, by virtue of your authority and pursuant to the principles recited above, do hereby solemnly proclaim that the territory and Region known as Eastern Nigeria, together with her continental shelves and territorial waters, shall henceforth be an independent sovereign state of the name and title, The Republic of Biafra.

This declaration of independence came just six years after Nigerian independence. It seemed that the nation created by Britain was unable to survive because one region could not accept the authority and domination of another.

The response to the eastern region’s Declaration was swift. Though Ojukwu hoped to avoid war, as made clear by the Declaration, on July 6^th 1967 Nigeria invaded, capturing Bonny in the South and surrounding the university town of Nsukka before General Ojukwu could launch the counter attack he had been preparing for since November. There were several factors which aided the Nigerian victory over Biafra. One was the ability of the federal government to impose a total economic blockade and communications blackout on Biafra. "Unaided and outgunned, Biafra had to surrender due to the blockade of Biafran ports by the Nigerian naval units" despite having the best army in black Africa. Some would argue that it was external support that had the greatest impact on the outcome of the war. Biafra seemed to have a great deal of democratic support, but not in the same way that Nigeria was supported. By examining their external supporters we once again see the effect of a colonial legacy.

PART IV: EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Britain came out firmly in support of the federal government of Nigeria and their efforts to maintain the territorial integrity of the nation, though after a brief period of waiting to see what direction the war would take. There were three major considerations that molded the British policy towards Nigeria. The first was national interest, broadly meaning the huge economic stake Britain had in Nigeria, the safety of British nationals, the strategic importance of Nigerian oil, and political "invisibles" such as support in world councils like the UN. Nigeria was home to about twelve thousand British subjects, the most populous country in Africa, and had the potential to be the most prosperous. Oil was an especially sensitive issue since Britain had been forced to withdraw from the Gulf, and the Suez Canal closed in June 1967. They also had to take into account their relationship with other African countries and by supporting Nigeria it kept them in step with the O.A.U. and the bulk of African opinion.

Nigeria was Britain’s proudest colonial achievement, and this sentiment, along with morality, was the second consideration shaping Britain’s policy. The question was, "is it morally right for a former colonial power to deprive its offspring of the means to maintain its existence and nationhood when faced with disintegration?" In Nigeria, where the "balkanization" theory was seemingly most valid, the likelihood was believed to be that had Biafra survived, the rest of the Federation would have surely fallen apart. The sentiment also stemmed from Nigeria’s position as Britain’s "show-piece of enlightened and civilized decolonization," being the only federation that showed signs of working. (However, by the time of the Biafran War those signs proved to be quite illusory.) Even though Britain felt so strongly about supporting the Federation in the war, it still took some eight months for Britain to show active support. The delay could be accounted for based on the fact that the strongest influence on British support was not economic, nor moral or sentimental, but Russia’s involvement.

At the initial point of Nigerian invasion into Biafra all the information supplied to the British cabinet led them to believe that the war would be over in a matter of weeks. That belief led the Cabinet to refuse to sell General Gowon (the Federal leader) any military aircraft on the grounds that they would not be needed and would only add to the mess. Because of this the Federal Commissioner for Labour and Information was sent to Moscow where he successfully negotiated an agreement to receive aircraft, beginning an arms race. Nigeria’s decision to turn to Russia told Britain two things: that would take arms from any source, and that they would "sell their moderate, pro-Western souls to the Communists to win the war." Britain could only respond in one of two ways: either stopping the war to erase any need for Soviet hardware, or assisting in the war effort on the Nigerian side. Britain was convinced of two things that kept them in support of Nigeria, even after having learned of the plight of the Biafrans. The first was that Biafran would be defeated within a short amount of time, and so the best thing was to discourage Biafra and not prolong their suffering. The second was Russia’s growing diplomatic and commercial stake in Lagos which implied that if Britain pulled support and supplies of arms, Nigeria would then fall into the Russian sphere of influence which would prevent Western access to Nigeria’s oil supply and endanger Europe’s access to the East by the Cape route. Regardless of the influence of Russia, in the end Britain could point to "the successful defense of its national interest and the fulfillment of its moral obligations to the Federal state of Nigeria" as the major reasons for its support.

Biafra too was afforded European support during the war, from both France and Portugal. Though Portugal’s support was the most valuable because the airports at Lisbon, Bissau, and São Tomé "constituted an excellent staging link and Biafra had its chief arms-buying mission based in Lisbon, they did not supply arms. The most visible support came from France, beginning when, on July 31^st 1968, France announced support for Biafran self-determination and called for international action to end the war. The French minister of state for information, Joel le Theule, announced in Paris "the French government believes, as a result [of the Biafran’s will to assert themselves as a people], the present conflict should be settled on the basis of the right of the people to self-determination and should involve the setting in motion of the appropriate international procedures." Still, though France recognized Biafra’s right to statehood, they did not recognize Biafra as a sovereign state. They aided Biafra as much as they could within limits, but still saw the situation as an "African issue."

Considering the inconsistent behavior of France we must question why they bothered to support Biafra. They did not have the same moral or sentimental reasons Britain had for supporting Nigeria, nor did they have the national interests dependent on a Biafran win. French intervention did enough to save Biafra from defeat, prolonged the war, but fell short of enabling Biafra to win it. The motivation behind French policy concerning Biafra can be explained through three major political considerations. Jacques Foccart was President de Gaulle’s Special Advisor on African Affairs and the trusted confidant of a dozen African presidents. He had previously spread his interests from his francophone base in West Africa into English-speaking African countries and the Nigerian crisis gave him his biggest opening yet. The first major consideration was that de Gaulle and Foccart still needed and wanted to maintain his position with the French-speaking countries. "A united, successful Nigeria presented a strong pole of attraction to the weak, fragmented francophone states around it and threatened to upset the balance of power in West Africa to the detriment of French influence."

The second consideration was that Biafra was a nationalism struggle for self-determination which appealed to de Gaulle’s political and ideological instincts. He admired the Biafrans’ "guts" and by assisting Biafra France would be "fulfilling its historic and Gaullist-inspired destiny of encouraging true nationalism, strengthening the middle way between the world’s two power blocs and asserting France’s own independence from the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians who, in this case, were all conveniently-lined up on the Nigerian side." The final consideration was the persuasion of Houphouet-Boigny, president of the Ivory Coast, who was de Gaulle’s oldest and most respected African friend. Interestingly, economic interests were not much of a factor. This is perhaps because the reasons France supported Biafra were not so much to benefit Biafra as to counter efforts of Britain. The lack of economic need for a Biafran win could also have been the reason why France did not do anything to ensure Biafra’s success.

France’s inconsistent behavior towards Biafra was obvious in its arms dealings with the seceding region. They were quick with their support, unlike Britain who hesitated before backing Nigeria, but it was "indirect, limited, and painstakingly clandestine." Also, France never took a formal stance on arms sales, and while for the most part their hardware went to Biafra, it was not unusual for a planeload of armored cars to occasionally be sold to Nigeria (though France stopped short of supplying the Federation with jet fighters and heavy weapons.) France’s uncommitted assistance and decision to play both sides was most likely due to the surprising strength of Nigeria’s allies, as well as caution. Francophone Africa was one of Frances primary considerations for involvement in the Nigerian crisis and was deeply split by it. Two of Nigeria’s French speaking neighbors, Niger and Cameroon, were as pro-Nigeria as Gabon and the Ivory Coast were pro-Biafra. Feeling nervous and not wanting to isolate any country, France simply pulled back, and successfully was able to play both sides. As put by John de St. Jorre,

"At some undetermined stage it seemed as if the French government decided that the war was unwinnable and that by providing enough arms to keep Biafra going and yet simultaneously maintaining diplomatic relations with Lagos, it would retain a valuable degree of flexibility and protect its existing interests on both sides while standing to profit enormously if Biafra, through Nigeria’s default, should eventually emerge victorious."

So while Nigeria had Britain actively working for its success, Biafra was given halfhearted support from France and lackadaisical assistance from Portugal. Despite the newly supposed international interest in humanitarian aid and assistance, when a group of people decide secession is the best way to end ethnic persecution they find themselves fighting a losing battle more or less alone. Should we conclude from the Biafra case that secession is not the way to end ethnic conflict? Or is this an anomaly where a colonial past had more influence than the prospects for an independent future?

From some perspectives it would appear that Biafra was simply unlucky. Though there are few examples of successful secessionist movements, Bangladesh illustrates what a region needs to win their struggle. For one, the two territories of Pakistan were separated by over a thousand miles of Indian territory. Unlike Biafra, East Pakistan was never in position of vulnerability to a blockade. The leadership also played a role. Though the Biafran secession had democratic support, it was led by a military leader which led external forces to question the popularity of the movement. The Bangladeshi war was led by a victorious political party so there was no way to doubt the community support. Unlike Bangladesh who had unwavering support from India, Biafra was unable to ever receive more than weak and unenthusiastic external support. These are factors which explain the success of East Pakistan and the failure of Biafra, but they do not justify it. Frankly, the secession of Biafra would have been more justified than Bangladesh based solely on the fact that Biafra and Nigeria would have both been left economically stable while Bangladesh was dependent upon the western part of Pakistan.

It is difficult to support the argument that Biafra was denied the right to succeed because more important than their sovereignty was the need to maintain the territorial integrity of Nigeria. Realistically speaking, the territorial boundaries of "Nigeria," nonexistent until colonization by Europe, had very little meaning for the people encompassed by them. Also, the argument that secession would not work because the seceding region would not be ethnically homogenous is weak without empirical evidence to show that success and homogeneity are contingent on each other. The fact is, the unitary Republic suggested by Ironsi before the second coup would have assumingly been the central government in Biafra and would have protected the rights of minorities. What would have been the strongest argument against Biafra’s secession was the claim that Biafra failed to exhaust all peaceful means. The Aburi meeting suggests otherwise, and considering the obvious genocide of Ibos occurring in the northern region, secession seemed to be the only option left. The conclusion must be reached that the reason Biafra could not succeed in secession was the impact of European intervention in the war. It was stated earlier that the O.A.U. was in a position where they could not encourage secession even if was the best option, but Britain simply would not. Looking at the current state of Nigeria there is no doubt that the country would be better off had secession occurred. The North still dominates the rest of the country, the eastern region has yet to recover from the impact of a three year civil war, and Ibos continue to suffer from discrimination in northern regions of Nigeria. What we now have is a country created by Europe, exploited by Europe and when it suited Europe’s interests, led astray.

de St. Jorre, John; The Nigerian Civil War; Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1972

Eze, Onyeabo; "Nigeria-Biafra Conflict; social and economic background"; 1972

Heraclides, Alexis; "Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 3, Summer, 1990, pp. 341-378

Horowitz, Donald L.; "The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 2, April 2003, pp. 5-17

Islam, M. Rafiqul; "Secessionist Self-Determination: Some Lessons from Katanga, Biafra, and Bangladesh," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No. 3, Sept. 1985, pp. 211-

221

Kamanu, Onyeonoro S.; Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: And O.A.U. Dilemma," The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, Sept. 1974, pp355-376

Nafziger, E. Wayne & William L. Richter; "Biafra and Bangladesh: The Political Economy of Secessionist Conflict," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1976, pp. 91-109

Opia, Eric Agume; Why Biafra? Aburi, Prelude to the Biafran Tragedy; Leswing Press, San Rafael, CA, 1972

Waugh, Auberon & Suzanne Cronjé; Biafra: Britain’s Shame; Michael Joseph LTD, London, 1969

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